The protection of fundamental rights before the European Court of Human Rights and domestic Constitutional Courts. A theoretical framework of analysis
International and constitutional law, originally distinct realms with small areas of intersection, are getting closer and closer to one another. This is particularly true within the human rights protection field, where mere contacts between the two systems have become intersections and overlaps. The European landscape of human rights protection is probably the stand-out example of such a trend, where several "Charters" (National Constitutions, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), the European Social Charter) and "Courts" (national Constitutional Courts (CCs), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the European Court of Human Rights The present paper focuses on the relationship between the international (ECHR) and constitutional pillars of human rights protection -with specific regard to the Italian constitutional system -trying to shed light on the still unsolved and problematic issues to which overlapping human rights protection systems give rise.
In the first place, we need to identify the knots which create such a tangle.
From a formal point of view, the first intersection between the two legal orders is determined by the nature of the Convention: the ECHR is an international treaty to which the Contracting Parties have decided to be bound, and recognize as having a specific legal value in the domestic constitutional area. Such recognition takes place in a different way for each Contracting State, and the legal status of the ECHR within the national sphere is different too: there are States in which the Convention has been granted the status of by the Contracting Parties, which, through ratification and/or execution, make the ECHR part of domestic legal orders. However, because of this the ECHR does not just provide individuals with a subsidiary and additional remedy against fundamental rights violations; it can also influence the interpretation and the application of domestic Bills of Rights, in ways that partially depend on the legal value accorded to the ECHR within the domestic order.
On this point, as one would expect, the general approach adopted by States towards international law becomes particularly prominent. For the sake of simplicity, we can limit our analysis to the monistic and the dualistic State approach, both well known. While in monistic States international treaties become part of the domestic order as soon as they are ratified by the competent national authorities, States following a dualistic path mandatorily require an internal order (i.e. the "execution order") for a treaty to be transposed into the domestic system.
The prototype of the first model is Austria, where the ECHR has been considered since 1964 directly applicable federal constitutional law, being formally equivalent to the original recital of fundamental rights enshrined in the Austrian Constitution. Austria is most probably the 'State which has gone furthest in incorporating the Convention' (Bernhardt 1993: 27) , since the rights provided by the Convention complement constitutional rights and have become constitutional parameters in the judicial review of legislation (Montanari 2002: 62) .
On the other hand, Italy -upon which the following analysis will prominently focus in order to provide useful elements for a better understanding of the case analyzed in Section 4 -is an example of dualistic State, although the evolutionary trend of the last decade depicts a new kind of dualism, whose features are particularly intriguing for the purpose of this paper.
In Italy, the ordinary law no. 848 of August 4, 1955 executed and therefore incorporated the ECHR into the domestic order. Consequently, it was recognized from the outset as having the same legal value as any ordinary parliamentary statute. Some scholars held a minority position (Quadri 1968: 68) proposing to interpret Article 10, para. 1 of the Italian Constitution (It. Const.) as also capable of influencing the ECHR legal position within the internal system. Since Article 10 states that 'the Italian legal order conforms to the generally recognized rules of international law', it automatically incorporates international customary norms into the domestic system and vests them with a constitutional status. According to this minority doctrine, due to the automatic incorporation through Article 10 It. Const. of the customary rule pacta sunt servanda, international treaties too -and therefore the ECHR -would acquire such a constitutional value capable of prevailing over conflicting ordinary laws. However, the Italian Constitutional Court (CC) constantly rejected this stance, confirming that Article 10 It.
Const. could not cover international treaty law, which, therefore, could only get the rank pertaining to the act used for its transposition into the domestic order.
I
Despite this strong dualistic stance that dominated the initial CC approach -an approach that lasted almost fifty years -such jurisprudence intermittently revealed signals of the CC's awareness of the deep interconnection between the Conventional system of protection of rights and the national one. Indeed, it is worth mentioning for example Judgment no. 388/1999 388/ (Pollicino 2015 , II Court is entrusted with the power to interpret the Convention, according to the ECHR legal system, the ECHR as it "lives" in the creative interpretation of the ECtHR -and not the bare ECHR provisions by themselves -becomes relevant in the CC constitutional adjudication.
In our opinion, this jurisprudence is particularly interesting for the aim of this paper.
On the one hand, it highlights the fundamental role of the courts in interpreting the Charters of Rights and, therefore, in concretely ensuring the protection of rights enshrined therein. The CC is the authoritative interpreter of the domestic Constitution, while the ECtHR is the authoritative interpreter of the Convention, and it is precisely through the dialogue between these two judicial authorities that the multilevel protection of rights takes form. On the other hand, however, such relationships between two Charters and two
Courts sketches out a new kind of dualism, where the boundaries between separation and integration inevitably blur.
It is probably Judgment no. 317/2009 that reveals the clearest expression of such peculiar dualism. In the judgment the CC stated:
'It is evident that this Court cannot permit Article 117, para. 1 of the Constitution to determine a lower level of protection compared to that already existing under internal law, but neither can it be accepted that a higher level of protection which is possible to introduce through the same mechanism should be denied to the holders of a fundamental right. The consequence of this reasoning is that the comparison between the Convention protection and constitutional protection of fundamental rights must be carried out seeking to obtain the greatest expansion of guarantees, including through the development of the potential inherent in the constitutional norms which concern the same right'. IX
In other words, the CC is asserting that, on the one hand, the ECHR is an external source of law (namely, the Constitution and the ECHR are still separated), and therefore it can only enter the domestic order as long as it is consistent with the supreme law of that order, i.e. the domestic Constitution as a whole. Accordingly, the CC is the sole and final arbiter of domestic fundamental rights adjudication. On the other hand, the ECHR and the constitutional Bill of Rights are also mutually integrated. Thus, since the aim of constitutional adjudication is to 'obtain the greatest expansion of guarantees' through a comparison between the conventional and the constitutional protection of rights, the two catalogues of rights do ultimately and definitively interplay. In conclusion, we might probably speak of a sort of "intertwined dualism".
3. Looking at the differences: Structure, procedure and institutional features of fundamental rights adjudication at the ECHR and the domestic level
Despite the ever growing intersection between national and international levels of rights protection, and despite the will of the two levels to find a mutual accommodation and integration, there are several elements that make this path rough and tortuous. In this regard the different function, nature and legitimacy of national and international courts play a fundamental role. Even though in practice the differences are nuanced, and we can even Therefore, even the subjects of scrutiny differ: the Strasbourg Court is case oriented, being the judge of a single case; on the contrary, the Constitutional Courts' task is that of judicial review of legislation. This is why even the effects of scrutiny are dissimilar: while the ECtHR case law aims at redressing individual violations, the CCs, on the contraryeven when starting from an individual application -aim at restoring the constitutional integrity of the system, erasing the law that infringes a fundamental right, with erga omnes effects. Moreover, the different aims that drive the two Courts condition both the flexibility, and the outcome of the judgment. Thus, the nature of individual justice embedded in the Strasbourg system of protection of rights drives the ECtHR to condemn the respondent State when a violation of rights occurs in a particular case, regardless of whether there may exist a widespread national praxis according to which the law involvedwhich produced the infringement in this instance -is normally interpreted in a manner consistent with the protection of rights. On the other hand, CCs, being by their very nature a tool intended to preserve the integrity of the whole order entrenched in the judicial review on legislation, are not inclined to declare a law unconstitutional when there is the possibility that it may be interpreted in a fundamentally rights-oriented way.
Even when looking at procedures, we see more differences than similarities. For example, a typical feature of the ECtHR is the possibility given to the judges to make concurring or dissenting opinions (White and Boussiakou 2009: 37-60 In both cases, the applicants challenged national law provisions (in the one case the This case study is emblematic of overlapping areas in human rights jurisdiction and is an outstanding example of the different approaches adopted by national and international courts in dealing with human rights adjudication.
In particular, this contribution aims, through the analysis of the ECtHR and the Italian CC cases, to shed light on such different approaches (which led in the case under examination to opposite conclusions). It will seek the reasons for these divergences and will address the vital question of who is the guardian of fundamental rights in the pluralistic landscape of European space. None of these techniques was allowed under the Artificial Procreation Act. The applicants argued before the Austrian Constitutional Court that the law's provisions were in breach of art. 8 ECHR and of art. 7 of the Austrian Constitution (the latter protecting equal treatment). The Austrian Constitutional Court, whose function -among others -is that of ruling on the compatibility of the national legislation with the ECHR, given the "constitutional status" of the ECHR mentioned above, recognized that the impugned provisions interfered with the right to family life according to art. 8 ECHR; however, such interference was justified by the attempt performed by the legislature to properly balance the conflicting interests of human dignity, the right to procreation and the child's interest.
The Court underlined the legitimate rationale under the law provision, which was to avoid the creation and development of unusual family relationships, such as a child having more than one biological mother, and to avoid the risk of exploitation of women donating ova.
Moreover, the Court found that the ban on heterologous fertilization was not in breach of the principle of equality, given the substantial differences between homologous and heterologous techniques. 
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The Grand Chamber in S.H. v. Austria first of all recognized that the right for a couple to conceive a child and to make use of assisted reproduction techniques for that purpose is protected by Article 8 of the Convention, because it is an expression of private and family life. Member States, within their margin of appreciation, can adopt measures aimed at guaranteeing an effective respect for private and family life. However, such measures have to be 'in accordance with the law'; they have to pursue one or more legitimate aims and they 'have to be necessary in a democratic society'. In the case under examination, according to the Court, such measures were laid down in the Artificial and Procreation Act, which 'pursued a legitimate aim, namely the protection of health or morals and the protection of the rights and freedom of others' (para. 90).
In particular, the rationale underlying the prohibition of ovum donation for in vitro fertilization laid down by section 3.1 of the Artificial Procreation Act responds to the risk embedded in heterologous fertilization with ovum donation, namely, the threat to the basic principle of mater semper certa. We are referring to the split of motherhood between a genetic mother and another merely carrying the child, as well the risk of the exploitation of women, particularly those in economic or social difficulties.
More complex is the reasoning concerning the prohibition of sperm donation for IVF.
Under the Austrian legislation, in fact, sperm donation is not banned in every case, but only in that of in vitro fertilization, while in vivo fertilization is allowed. Moreover, IVF with sperm donation combined two techniques which, taken individually, were allowed under the Austrian legislation: in vivo fertilization with sperm donation and in vitro fertilization. In the previous decision concerning the case under examination, the Chamber argued that the only reason underlying the prohibition of the combination of two medical techniques, which taken individually were allowed, was the fact that 'in vivo artificial insemination has been in use for some time, was easy to handle and its prohibition would therefore have been hard to monitor'. The Chamber considered such an argument, related only to a question of efficiency, inconsistent in order to justify the prohibition of sperm donation for IVF. The Grand Chamber, on the contrary, reversed the Chamber's decision, arguing that 'when examining the compatibility of a prohibition of a specific artificial procreation technique with the requirements of the Convention, the legislative framework of which it forms part must be taken into consideration and the prohibition must be seen in this wider context'.
Starting from this premise, the Court stressed the fact that the prohibition of sperm donation for IVF, rather than in vivo fertilization, showed 'the careful and cautious approach adopted by the Austrian legislature in seeking to reconcile social realities with its approach of principle in this field' and it was therefore compatible with art. 8 of the Convention. However, 'even if it finds no breach of Art. 8 in the present case, the Court considers that this area in which the law appears to be continuously evolving and which is subject to a particular dynamic development in science and law, needs to be kept under review by the Contracting States' (para. 118).
The application of the theory of margin of appreciation in connection with the theory of consensus, in its different meanings (European and internal consensus), played a central role in the Court reasoning.
Firstly, the Court recognized that in cases where an important facet of an individual's existence or identity is at stake, the State normally sees its margin being narrowed down.
However, in the case of IVF, the margin accorded to the State has to be a wider one, given the lack of a long-standing consensus among Member States on the moral and ethical issues involved.
As we may all know, in fact, the margin of appreciation and consensus are intuitively in an inversely proportional relationship: the more widespread and settled the consensus, the narrower the margin; and conversely, the weaker and more unsettled the consensus, the wider the margin. This explains why in sensitive matters like the one analyzed in this paper, the margin is usually quite wide, since consensus is still 'emerging' and not yet 'based on settled and long-standing principles' (para. 96).
In particular, the Court recognized an emerging consensus among Member States in allowing gamete donation for IVF. However, this consensus is not based on long-standing principles embedded in the law of Member States; rather, it reflects only 'a stage of development within a particularly dynamic field of law and does not decisively narrow the margin of appreciation of the State' (para. 96).
If the lack of European consensus was used by the Court in order to justify the wide margin of appreciation accorded to the Austrian legislator, the lack of internal consensus within the national society was used to further sustain the legitimacy of Austrian legislation.
The Court argued, in fact, that the prohibition of gamete donation reflected a cautious approach by the Austrian legislator toward a matter which raises complex questions of an ethical nature and on which there is not yet a consensus in society. In contrast, the Court seemed to use the concept of internal consensus in order to justify the permission of sperm donation for in vivo fertilization, which was recognized as 'a technique which had been tolerated for a considerable period beforehand and had become accepted by society' (para. having a constitutional status, a balanced approach was required in order to grant each of these interests an adequate protection. The safeguarding of embryos, indeed, is not absolute; it encounters limits in the need to protect a legitimate claim to procreation.
Secondly, the CC stated that the identification of a reasonable balance between all the conflicting interests at stake pertains primarily to the political evaluation of the legislature, which in matters like this is called on to adequately take into consideration the fast-moving developments of medical science XVII too. Lastly, the CC confirmed that, although important, such a political discretion cannot affect the power of the CC to review the "non-unreasonableness" of the legislative decision.
Before analyzing in more details the reasoning followed by the CC, and in order to better appreciate its relevance for the purposes of this paper, it may be interesting to briefly examine the background of this Judgment. 
A comparative analysis: connections and disconnections between the ECHR and the Italian constitutional level in the heterologous IVF case
The brief analysis of the ECtHR's and the Italian CC's decisions on this matter -which depict one of the most emblematic examples of the intertwined, but different nature of fundamental rights adjudication at international and constitutional level -explains quite clearly why we chose the IVF case as the focus of this paper. This difference of outcome, however, probably depends on the different type of scrutiny carried out by the Courts: the ECtHR looked uniquely into the alleged breach of Article 8 ECHR, while the CC took into consideration the constitutional framework as a whole. As mentioned above, the unconstitutionality of the Italian ban on heterologous IVF was not declared as a result of the violation of specific constitutional rights considered individually, but rather of the largely unfair balance adopted at the legislative level between all the conflicting interests at stake. We do not see it as a coincidence that, in Judgment No.
162/2014, the CC started by saying that its review would take into account all the parameters invoked, and consider them jointly, in order to prevent the protection of certain fundamental rights from developing in an unbalanced manner to the detriment of other rights also protected by the Constitution. XXIV But a further difference between the two systems, international and constitutional, may ensue from such a different approach in adjudicating human rights issues. From the duty to take into account all of the Constitutional parameters jointly, even when an issue of compatibility with an ECHR right is at stake, the CC derives, in fact, a right to claim what it names "its own margin of appreciation" in assessing the role played by the ECHR -in the interpretation provided by the ECtHR -within the domestic system. Accordingly, both Courts expressly resort to the "margin of appreciation doctrine". It is, however, obvious that the margin of appreciation as conceived and claimed by the CC is something different from the margin of appreciation as originally developed by the ECtHR. .] In summary, the national "margin of appreciation" can be determined having regard above all to the overall body of fundamental rights, the detailed and overall consideration of which is a matter for the legislature, the Constitutional Court and the ordinary courts, each within the ambit of its own jurisdiction' ( §7).
We could probably say that the clearest deployment of "its own margin of appreciation doctrine" is found in the Italian CC's well-known "Swiss pensions case", in which a challenge to legislation was at stake, retrospectively modifying the arrangements applicable 303). What is sure, however, is that, as can be observed in the CC jurisprudence, by deploying "its own margin of appreciation" the CC does not directly challenge the ECtHR's judgments; it can merely deprive the latter of their effectiveness within the Italian system in the light of a systemic interpretation of the constitutional framework as a whole.
Accordingly, it is a margin of appreciation claimed against the ECtHR, and after the latter has settled the case, whilst at the same time avoiding an open conflict with the European Court. The CC seems to be wishing to say: 'I respectfully disagree ' (Martinico 2017: 417) .
With regard to the Strasbourg side, and as highlighted by Sir Nicolas Bratza, a former President of the ECtHR, the margin of appreciation was instead introduced into the ECtHR's jurisprudence as a 'valuable tool devised by the Court itself to assist it in defining the scope of its review'. It does not provide blanket exceptions in the application of rights; rather, it ensures that human rights under the ECHR develop according to a pluralistic pattern, enabling its 'striking an optimum equilibrium between convergence and divergence in a transnational or international setting' (Rosenfeld 2008: 450) . Even though it could seemingly jeopardize the universalistic ambition naturally implied in the international protection of human rights, the margin of appreciation doctrine was introduced as a useful tool to accommodate diversity in the field of human rights: it is believed to be a kind of 'key to ordering pluralism', meaning that 'on the one hand, it expresses the centrifugal dynamic of national resistance to integration' and 'on the other, since the margin is not unlimited but bounded by shared principles, it sets a limit, a threshold of compatibility that leads back to the centre (centripetal dynamic)' (Delmas-Marty 2009: 44).
Hence, the ECtHR's margin of appreciation allows States to approach fundamental rights issues in the light of their national Constitutional identity, since they are allowed to find the most satisfactory solution to rights protection, one that is also coherent with the moral and social values embedded in their national systems. Conversely, when the majority of Contracting States shows a common trend in dealing with a specific issue, the ECtHR infers that a general consensus among States exists on the protection required for the Conventional right at stake, and that, therefore, the need to preserve the single national constitutional identity may be pushed into the background. Consequently, it is no coincidence that the margin of appreciation and consensus among States are in an inversely proportional relationship, as already pointed out above.
Actually, the ECtHR's doctrine of the margin of appreciation allows flexibility in reviewing the State's compliance with the ECHR, by recognizing that, as far as it is possible, 'by reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, the State authorities are, in principle, in a better position than the international judge to give an opinion, not only on the "exact content of the requirements of morals" in their country, but also on the necessity of a restriction intended to meet them'. XXIX Accordingly, we can argue that the margin of appreciation is also a legitimizing tool for the ECtHR, which -as an international court -needs to rely on States' consent to ensure that its judgments are effective.
Instead, the CC does not need to seek for legitimacy. It already possesses its own legitimacy, directly stemming from the domestic Constitution, which entrusted the CC with the task of preserving the constitutional integrity of the national system. It follows that, while the ECtHR resorts to the margin of appreciation to get legitimacy, by deploying its own margin of appreciation the CC exhibits its constitutionally embedded legitimacy, and it claims its authority on constitutional matters. In conclusion, it is only apparently that the ECtHR and the CC refer to the same doctrine, when they speak of margin of appreciation.
Rather, as a matter of fact, their margin of appreciation has a different meaning and performs different functions. Judgment No. 162/2014, though at that time it preferred not to settle the case.
Taking stock: A tale of two Courts at the crossroads at the protection of rights
The analysis of the heterologous IVF case highlighted how the connections and disconnections between the international and constitutional level of protection of rights, theoretically depicted in Sections 2 and 3 of this contribution, operate concretely. Along with a deep awareness of the intertwined nature of fundamental rights adjudication nowadays, shown by both Courts in their case law, Judgments on heterologous IVF emphasize also several differences, pertaining to the outcome of the scrutiny, the approach taken and the apparent resort to the same doctrine by the two Courts involved -i.e. the margin of appreciation -, which is conversely very differently deployed. However, this explanation is not entirely convincing. Also, it is worth mentioning that the ECtHR's Grand Chamber closed its S.H. Judgment in the following terms:
'The Court also notes that the Austrian Constitutional Court, when finding that the legislature had complied with the principle of proportionality under Article 8, par. 2 of the Convention, added that the principle adopted by the legislature to permit homologous methods of artificial procreation as a rule and insemination using donor sperm as an exception reflected the current state of medical science and the consensus in society. This, however, did not mean that these criteria would not be subject to developments which the legislature would have to take into account in the future.
[…] The [ECHR] Court reiterates that the Convention has always been interpreted and applied in the light of current circumstances. Even it finds no breach of Article 8 in the present case, the Court considers that this area, in which the law appears to be continuously evolving and which is subject to a particularly dynamic development in science and law needs to be kept under review by the Contracting States'. XXXII That is to say: the ECtHR had decided to anchor its judgment on the merits of the case to the time when the case originally arose, therefore at the end of the '90s. As we can see, by merely stating that an evaluation which was perfectly valid when pertaining to a situation arising in 1998 no longer needed to be followed in 2014, the Italian CC could have ruled the case in an international perspective too, without contradicting the ECtHR. The More plausibly, therefore, it seems arguable that the CC's choice to rule the case in Judgment No. 162/2014 by focusing on purely domestic constitutional parameters depended on circumstances pertaining to the complex relationship between the ECHR and the domestic protection of fundamental rights and, ultimately, the relationship between the two "constitutional" courts, each ruling its respective system. Putting it differently; in doing so, the CC actually seemed to reveal a wish to connect constitutional human rights adjudication to the supranational dimension of fundamental rights protection, while at the same time not bowing to the ECtHR's authority.
The reasons for the CC's attitude may be found in the special position held by the Italian CC at the crossroads of the multilevel protection of fundamental rights in Europe, whose peculiar nature depends both on the CC's relationship with domestic ordinary courts and on the specific character of fundamental rights adjudication in Italy.
The inclination of the CC to promote in so far as is possible the constitutional coherence of the domestic legal order through interpretation is well-known: according to its traditional jurisprudence, it is up to domestic ordinary courts to interpret ordinary legislation consistently with the Constitution without submitting an issue of constitutionality before the CC. Only where it is not possible to settle the conflict between a law and a constitutional provision by interpretation, and therefore only where a law cannot be interpreted coherently with the Constitution, a judicial review of legislation can be brought before the CC. However, in doing so, the CC, in so far as it empowers ordinary judges to pronounce on human rights issues, ends up by depriving itself of its role as human rights adjudicator, though only partially. In contrast, the Italian system of constitutional adjudication does not provide individuals the opportunity to bring questions directly before the Constitutional Court. A judicial review by the CC can be triggered only either by a direct recourse by the State and the Regions, aimed at settling a question concerning the delimitation of their legislative competence, or by an issue incidentally raised by a judge during a concrete judicial proceeding where the constitutionality of a law to be used to settle the case is at stake. Therefore, the CC is not automatically involved when an alleged violation of human rights is at issue. XXXIV As the ECtHR asserted, 'the applicants cannot truly be reproached for failing to apply for a measure which, as had been explicitly stated by the Italian government, was forbidden in an absolute manner by the law'. XXXV Or, in other words, since 'it was certain that the applicants could not access PGD in Italy, it was useless for them to make such an application to the Italian health authorities and to then challenge the inevitable rejection of their application before the Italian courts' (Puppinck 2012: 156) .
In a case like the one we are discussing, it is obvious that by admitting direct recourse to the ECHR system when internal remedies, though theoretically accessible, do not present any chance of success, the ECtHR reduced the opportunity for the domestic CC to intervene preliminarily in order to safeguard the rights at stake at a national level.
XXXVI
The CC's decision to rule on the case concerning the ban on heterologous insemination, solely in the light of domestic constitutional parameters, could therefore be plausibly read as a reaction against Strasbourg's encroachments when the domestic system -and the CC in particular -had not yet had the opportunity to redress the violation autonomously. In other words, the CC may have aimed to strongly affirm that it is still primarily up to the States and national authorities to ensure fundamental rights protection. such an interaction among national and international levels of protection is therefore not completely predictable and cannot be attributed to the simple logic of hierarchy, but at the same time it represents the fundamental feature that permits the system to evolve dynamically.
 Antonia Baraggia is Research Fellow of Constitutional law at University of Milan, Italy. Maria Elena Gennusa is Associate Professor of Constitutional law at the University of Pavia, Italy. This manuscript is a revised and extended version of a paper presented at the International Conference "The Global Challenge Of Human Rights Integration: Towards A Users' Perspective", 9-11 December 2015, Ghent. Albeit its unitary conception, Antonia Baraggia drafted Sections 1, 3, 4 and paragraph 4.1; while Maria Elena Gennusa drafted Section 2, paragraph 4.2, and Sections 5 and 6. I See, among many, Judgments Nos. 104/1969 , 17/1981 , 15/1982 , 323/1989 , etc. Only Judgment No. 10/1993 seems to contradict a reconstruction of the ECHR status within the domestic system uniquely based on the formal rank of the execution order. Here, the CC states that that the ordinary law transposing the ECHR contains 'provisions arising from a source with atypical competence, and, as such, they are insusceptible to being repealed or modified by ordinary laws' (Tega 2013: 30) . This peculiar statement was not, however, reiterated in following decisions. Judgments from the Italian CC are all available at www.cortecostituzionale.it II As Pollicino argues 'since this decision, the Constitutional Court has seemed less interested in looking from a formal(istic) point of view at the static position of the ECHR in the hierarchy of the sources of law, and more interested, from a substantial and axiological point of view, and by reason of its fundamental rightsbased content, in its suitability to complement the recognition of inviolable fundamental rights protected by Article 2 of the Constitution'. III Constitutional Court, Judgment No. 388/1999, available XII The first applicant is married to the second applicant and the third applicant to the fourth applicant. The first applicant suffers from fallopian-tube-related infertility. She produces ova, but, due to her blocked fallopian tubes, these cannot pass to the uterus, so natural fertilization is impossible. The second applicant, her husband, is infertile. The third applicant suffers from agonadism, which means that she does not produce ova at all. She is completely infertile but has a fully developed uterus. The fourth applicant, her husband, in contrast to the second applicant, is not infertile. XIII For sake of completeness, Judgment No. 162 declared also Articles 9 (concerning the prohibition to disclaim paternity when resorting to heterologous artificial procreation) and 12 (containing the pecuniary penalty for heterologous procreation ban offenders) of Law No. 40/2014 to be unconstitutional. XIV XXIII ECHR, Parrillo v. Italy, 27 Aug. 2015 . XXIV This actually is a common trend in the CC case law. We can see it, for instance, in Judgment No. 85/2013, concerning the issue of constitutionality also raised with regard to Article 117, par. 1 (in connection with Article 6 ECHR) of legislation aimed at facing the very serious problem of the polluting emissions from the Ilva factory in the Taranto area. There too, the CC reiterated that 'the rationale of the contested provision is to strike a reasonable balance between the fundamental rights protected by the Constitution, including in particular the right to health (Article 31) and the derived right to a healthy environment, and the right to work (Article 4), from which the constitutionally significant interest of maintaining employment along with the duty incumbent upon public institutions to make all efforts to that effect are derived. All fundamental rights protected by the Constitution are mutually related to one another and it is thus not possible to identify any one of them in isolation as prevailing absolutely over the others. Protection must at all times be "systematic and not fragmented into a series of rules that are uncoordinated and potentially in conflict with one another". If this were not the case, the result would be an unlimited expansion of one of the rights, which would "tyrannizes" other legal interests recognized and protected under constitutional law, which constitute as a whole an expression of human dignity'. Therefore, the issue of constitutionality was declared groundless. (2015); Benvenisti (1999: 843) . XXVI The issue being that, whereas under the previous interpretation of the legislation, payment of contributions in Switzerland established entitlement to a pension in Italy on the basis of Italian contributions at equivalent salary, no matter that the contribution levels in Switzerland were significantly lower, as a result of an enactment providing for an "authentic interpretation", the Italian pension was to be calculated on the basis of the real level of the Swiss contribution, thus resulting in lower pensions. XXVII ECHR, Costa and Pavan v. Italy, 28 Aug. 2012 . XXXIV See also, ECHR, Parrillo v. Italy, cit., in which the ECtHR reiterated even more clearly that its decision to declare the individual application under examination admissible despite the fact that the prerequisite of the previous exhaustion of domestic remedies had not been met, depended primarily on the Italian system of Constitutional adjudication which does not provide individuals with the opportunity to bring their cases directly before the Constitutional Court. On the relevance accorded by the ECtHR to the direct access to CCs within the domestic systems of human rights adjudication, see ECHR, Hasan Uzun v. Turkey, 30 May 2013. XXXV ECHR, Costa and Pavan v. Italy, cit., para. 38. XXXVI Perhaps not coincidentally, in Judgment No. 96/2015, which is the internal follow-up of the ECtHR's decision Costa Pavan v. Italy, the CC declared the unconstitutionality of the prohibition for genetic disease carrier couples to have access to PGD solely on account of the violation of Articles 3 and 32 It. Const. (the former aimed at protecting the principle of equality and the latter at guaranteeing the right to health), all the other challenges remaining "absorbed" , included the one concerning Article 117, par. 1 It. Const. (and therefore Articles 8 and 14 ECHR). In the CC's reasoning, the blanket ban on PGD, if read jointly with the possibility allowed by the Italian legal system to terminate pregnancy where a fetus is affected by a genetic pathology, while introducing an element of inconsistency into the system, was judged "insuperably" unreasonable and therefore was declared unconstitutional. Here the message of the CC to the ECtHR seemed to be even clearer: it admitted that the outcome of its reasoning was the same as the one achieved by the ECtHR by expressly quoting the Judgment of the latter in the Costa and Pavan case. Nevertheless, it anchored its reasoning to uniquely internal parameters. The same outcome, but reached by a different path, we might say: as if it wished to restate that the domestic constitutional system can already possess all the tools with which to redress fundamental rights violations autonomously if it was given the opportunity to do so.
